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Abstract 
The effect of further public caregiving subsidies (and insurance expansions to cover 
long-term care) on savings and saving behaviour is far from clear. In this paper we take 
advantage of a policy intervention to study the effect on savings and savings behaviour 
of the progressive introduction of a universal public long-term care subsidy (Sistema 
para la Autonomía y Atención a la Dependencia, SAAD) from 2007 in Spain. We draw 
on a difference-in-difference strategy (DID) to show a contraction of savings after the 
policy intervention, but only among younguer elders who receive primarily cash 
benefits (unconditional caregiving allowance) as opposed to home help (ammouting 13-
38% of the allowance). Saving reductions of individuals in the second and third quintile 
of income distribution, those without children and those residing in regions that 
implemented the reform earlier, drive the effect.  
Keywords: long-term care insurance, savings, saving behaviour, long-term care services 
and support, universalisation, Spain. 
JEL classification numbers: I18, D14, G22. 
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I. Introduction 
Failing to save sufficiently for old age may have devastating financial 
consequences for families. One way to prevent these consequences is by the design of 
public subsidies (e.g., caregiving allowances), which could be either means tested or 
universal that pay for the expenses of old age individuals, including long-term care. 
Means tested subsidies are restrictive and likely to exert non-neutral effects on 
behaviour. However, the introduction of universal subsidies is not without unintended 
effects, including the potential for some crowding out of individual’s savings 
motivations. Whether this is the case is a contentious question given that long-term care 
is only one of the reasons for domestic precautionary savings at old age, and social 
norms may play a role.  
 
The expansion of social protection in different areas has been found to exert a 
non-neutral effect on savings. Reductions in pension entitlements are found to increase 
people’s saving rates (Attanasio and Brugiavini, 2003) and, the same applies to tax 
subsidies (Engelhardt, 1996). Similarly, evidence indicates that the introduction of 
unemployment insurance programmes can disincentivise precautionary saving 
motivations (Engen and Gruber, 2001). Consistently, some studies identify a 
generalised decline in savings after the expansion of health insurance. In the US, 
DiNardi et al. (2010) examined the effect of Medicare-expanded insurance on 
precautionary savings, and in the UK, Guariglia and Rossi (2004) examined the same 
effect of private health care. Some studies have found that even means-tested 
entitlements influence people’s saving behaviour (Hubbard et al., 1994; Powers, 1998). 
However, can these results be extended to changes in the public subsidisation of long-
term care (LTC)? This is an important policy question in ageng societies who are 
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subject to significant fiscal contraints (Costa-Font et al., 2015).  We are aware of one 
study that shows that states in the United States whith easier access to Medicaid 
assistance exhibit lower savings (Sevak and Walker, 2007). 
Evidence from the introduction of LTC subsidies, including public LTC 
insurance expansions often  qualify as unique quai-experiments. Family reactions to the 
expansion of a public LTC subsidy are largely difficult to predict beforehand, especially 
when female labour market participation is on the rise and social norms on caregiving 
duties are adjusted accordingly. Similarly, it is unclear whether cash or in kind subsidies 
exert comparable effects on savings, if at all.  
More genenrally, it is not always trivial to ascertain whether an expansion of a 
universal public subsidy (based on the needs tests alone at the time of need) will exert a 
reaction in the family finances. A universal subsidy could reduce an incentive to save if 
individuals anticipate that if they live beyond a certain age they have a higher change to 
intensively use LTC services. Even when a LTC entitlement is clearly defined, there is 
always some uncertainty about whether the individual will meet the needs test and, even 
when they qualify, governemnts grants subsidies with some delays, and there’s 
uncertainty about the development of the illness or the time one would be still alive1. 
Hence, whether an immediate change in saving behaviour takes place after the 
introduction of a new subsidy among those who are entitled rests as an empirirical 
question. Certainly, to inform policy design, it is important to estimate the magnitude of 
such an effect, if it is found to exist, and whether the effect can be genenralised to any 
form of support, or is specific of public subsidies.  
One econometric strategy to examine the sensitivity of savings to the expansion 
                                                          
1 Finally, unless some explicit social insurance scheme is developed (e.g. as in Germany or Japan), there 
is always some uncertainty as to whether existing financial entitlements will remain or will be modified 
(e.g. as we will show occurred in 2012 in Spain, where the subsidy was significantly reduced as a result 
of the recessionary spending cuts). 
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of subsidies for LTC is to take advantage of the evidence of a universal reform 
expanding the public financing of LTC, either in the form of in kind care or cash 
subsidies. That is, we attempt to compare whether individuals that benefit from such a 
reform change their savings behaviour. Generally, when an individual qualifies for 
either a cash or caregiving support, it generally remains for the rest of his/her lifetime. 
Hence, we hypothesize whether beneficiaries adjust their saving behaviour after being 
entitled to publicly funded cash or in kind support2.  
Thus, in this paper we draw upon the introduction of a new universal demand 
subsidy that was progressively implemented across Spain from 2007 to replace a pre-
existing means-tested caregiving scheme. Heterogeneity of this reform varies by region 
and by need. Indeed, some Spanish region states implemented the new regulation earlier 
than others. Similarly, more severely disabled individuals were the first to benefit from 
the policy. Finally, we test whethe  the effects are different among individuals with and 
without children, and after an individual turns 75 year of age there is change in financial 
wellbeing.  
 Our dataset allows examination of changes in saving behaviour at both the 
intensive margin (amount saved) and the extensive margin (probability of savings) after 
the introduction of a unique policy intervention that universalised a subsidy for those in 
need of long term care. We carry out a different subsample analysis for childless 
individuals (given that some intergenerational transfers may be affected by an insurance 
restructuring), including the effect of the policy adjustments in 2012 that reduced 
significantly the breadth of the subsidy and support.  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to test explicitly the effect of 
                                                          
2 Cash benefits are received by the dependent individual and are supposed to reward the informal 
caregiver for the provision of informal care. They are not a voucher, and there is not a supervision system 
to keep track exactly what has been done with them. 
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the expansion of public subsidy for LTC on savings. The Spanish reform we examine is 
the main countrywide reform that took place in Europe, also known as the Spanish Old 
Age Dependency Bill of 2007 (in Spain, Sistema para la Autonomía y Atención a 
la Dependencia, or SAAD). We use a difference-in-difference (DID) framework to test 
for the effect on savings. We examine four waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) corresponding to years 2004, 2006–7, 2011 and 2013, 
and draw on the difference-in-difference model to capture the effect of the new long-
term care system implemented in 2007 in Spain on savings.  
Our findings indicate a reduction in savings both at the intensive (amount saved) 
and at the extensive margin (probability of saving, or saving behaviour). However, the 
effect is primarily driven by a savings reduction of individuals under the age of 75 
receiving caregiving cash benefits (as opposed to home help). As expected, the savings 
reduction concentrated among individuals in the second and third quintile of income. 
We find a larger effect among those without children. The estimation of the model with 
different interactions for each year reveals that this negative effect is more intense in 
2007 and 2011, but in 2013 savings picked up again as a result of the reduction in the 
generosity of the public subsidy. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. 
Section II discusses the institutional background. Section III describes the data and 
methods. Section IV outlines the results, and Section V concludes. 
 
II. Long-term care reform in Spain 
The Spanish long-term care reforms resulted from the unexpected election, only three 
days before congressional elections, of a new socialist government following the 2004 
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Madrid bombings (Garcia Montalvo, 2011)3. The new parliament delivered a new 
socialist government whose reform program focused on the introduction of a universal 
entitlement to public support to fund LTC which replaced the pre-existing means tested 
scheme. The reform was known by the acronym SAAD, the Spanish translation of the 
longer name ‘Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care of Dependent People’ passed 
by Act 39/2006 of 14 December 2006.  
Before the introduction of SAAD, long term care was means tested and funded ly local 
authorities. The access to different social services (home care, day centres, residential 
homes) was conditioned to the score obtained in a rating scale that considered different 
characteristics (age, disability status, economic resources, family situation). However, 
the weights assigned to each characteristic were different across regions (IMSERSO, 
2004). On the other hand, the Social Security System was responsible for some 
elements of care in the form of economic benefits (major disability benefit, third-party 
benefits, non-contributory invalidity pensions, family benefits for dependent children) 
and social services (re-education and rehabilitation). 
The SAAD encompassed the introduction of a tax-funded entitlement to address the 
needs of older and dependent people. Funding was only partially provided by central 
government budget, as such funds has to be matched by regional funds, and individuals 
were expected to contribute to the funding too. In practice, SAAD is jointly run by the 
national and regional governments, which determine the services offered, the conditions 
and amount of financial benefits, the criteria for the participation of beneficiaries 
                                                          
3 The Madrid bombings lead to a hung parliament and a minority government in 2005, which in turn 
produced a proposal to the Parliamentary Bill in January 2006, but did not included a description of cash 
or in-kind benefits for dependent people. The Law proposal handled by Government initiative, was 
submitted for approval by the Congress and the Senate, and received 3 total amendments and 622 partial 
amendments (Lorenzo-García, 2006). Therefore, although there was knowledge that the Government was 
trying to adopt some kind of reform, Spanish citizens could not anticipate what benefits were going to be 
offered to beneficiaries 
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towards the cost of the services and the scale used to assess dependency. The Act 
39/2006 defined a universal entitlement to LTC under equal conditions for all elderly or 
disabled people who need help carrying out basic daily living activities.  
The SAAD reform encompassed an expansion of public funding, primarily that 
of regions (known as autonomous communities). Upon meeting a stringent needs test, 
the beneficiary may receive a financial benefit in order to be cared for by informal 
caregivers, as long as the home meets adequate standards of inhabitability and this is 
stated in the beneficiary’s individual care programme. Although the principles of the 
new subsidy apply across Spain, its implementation was largely the responsibility of the 
autonomous communities, which exhibited differing implementation speeds. By using 
the available data of the number of applications received by each autonomous 
community and the number of benefits awarded, we can distinguish fast-tracking 
regions, which implemented the reform faster than others.  
Unlike in the pre-reform period, where care was means tested by local 
authorities and by the Social Security system (e.g. non-contributory disability 
allowance), SAAD recognises the universal nature of benefits and entitlement, and an 
individual care assessment is carried out by every region to determine the services 
and/or benefits that best match the applicant’s needs. This programme is established 
with the participation of the beneficiary after the family is consulted. The subsidy is 
determined by needs, which are classified as ‘moderate dependency’, ‘severe 
dependency’ or ‘major dependency’. Additionally, funding is subject to a co-payment 
determined according to income and capital, but as we explained below it was not 
enforced.  
It should be noted that the access to the SAAD can result from two pathways, 
namely. First, individuals were not already receiving any type of benefit (major 
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disability benefit, third-party benefits, non-contributory invalidity pensions, family 
benefits for dependent children) should file a new application process from scratch, and 
they will be evaluated according to the Official Ranking Scale of the SAAD. In case 
they were qualified as moderate, severe or major dependent, they received a LTC 
benefit according to Figure 1. Second, individuals who were already receiving any of 
the benefits mentioned in the previous point, were afterwards evaluated according to the 
Ranking Scale to determine the equivalence with severe or major dependency. In this 
case, the amount of the benefit was computed following different rules.  
For the case of beneficiaries of major disability benefit, third-party benefits or 
family benefits for dependent children, the amount of previous benefit was deducted 
from the benefits provided by new long-term care benefit (art. 31 of the Law of 
Dependency). As the individual does not not receive the sum of both subsidies, it is 
guaranteed that any type of long-term care beneficiary assigned to the same dependency 
need receives the same amount of long-term care benefit, regardless of previous 
dependency status. However, for the case of non-contributory invalidity pensions the 
situation is different. This is a means-tested benefit and it can only be received if the 
individual satisfies both a dependency threshold (exceeding 65% dependency need 
level) and an income threshold. Additionally, this income threshold is conditioned to the 
number of household members and the kinship relationship with the dependent 
individual. In this case, the amount of the non-contributory invalidity pension is not 
deducted from the amount of the long-term care benefit. The 16th Additional Provision 
of the Law of Dependency determined that the non-contributory invalidity pension will 
be incremented up to a 25% of the corresponding amount for each beneficiary4.  
                                                          
4 In 2013, the amount of non-contributory disability benefit was 310.17 €/moth if the beneficiary lived 
with his/her spouse and 291.92 €/month if he lived with spouse and children. Therefore, the maximum 
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As mentioned above, the speed of implementation of SAAD was somewhat 
region specific. Consequently, there was a variation in the percentage of beneficiaries 
(e.g. 3.19 per cent in Andalusia versus 1.17 per cent in the Canaries, using data for 
2010)5, and hence it offers some variability to exploiting in addition to the time and 
individual specific variability. Similarly, the reliance on cash or in-kind benefits differs 
across regions, representing a high dispersion rate in the cost per dependent (e.g. €5,093 
in the Murcia region versus €12,715 in the Madrid region, while the percentage of 
informal caregivers’ benefits with respect to total benefits awarded are 68.7 and 18.6 
per cent, respectively; Barriga Martí et al., 2015).  
One of the most interesting features of the Spanish reform lies in the effect of the 
economic crisis on the need to reduce the Spanish public deficit (8.9 per cent at the 
beginning of 2012), which led to the implementation of a reduction in the subsidy to 
control public expenditure (see Figure 1 for a calendar of events). As part of budget 
cuts, the long-term care subsidy was slashed significantly in July 2012 (Royal Decree 
20/2012, 13 July 2012). Specifically, the long-term care subsidy for ‘moderate 
dependency’ people was delayed until 2015; hence only severe and major dependency 
people were supported. Among those, home care support declined from 70–90 
hours/month to 56–70 hours/month for ‘major dependency’ individuals and from 40–55 
hours/month to 31–45 hours/month for ‘severe dependency’ individuals. Finally, the 
subsidy of those receiving an equivalent cash allowance to pay for informal caregivers 
was reduced between 15 and 25 per cent conditional on dependency need. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
total amount of non-contributory disability benefit plus long-term care benefit could not exceed 310.17 x 
1.25 = 387 €/month in the first case, and 364.49 €/month in the second one. Comparing this figures with 
those shown in Figure 1, and supposing that the beneficiary is severe dependent, it is reasonable to 
assume that the amount received would be smaller compared to beneficiaries with the similar dependency 
need. 
5 It refers to beneficiaries with respect to the population aged 18 and over. We have used this threshold 
given the differences in the ranking scale between the population under and over the age of 18. 
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III. Data and methods 
1. Empirical strategy 
In our model, the treatment variable denotes an individual as a beneficiary after the 
introduction of subsidised long-term care (SAAD). We are interested in the effect of 
SAAD on savings (Y) when we account for a set of controls (X), time trend (𝜇𝑡) and 
regional fixed effects (𝜂𝑖). Hence, we follow a classical strategy as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝜇𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Savings, computed in monthly terms, are a stock variable defined as the sum of 
three components: (i) bank accounts, (ii) bond, stock and mutual funds, (iii) savings for 
long-term investments, minus financial liabilities. Afterwards we compute real savings 
taking as reference 2011. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 is a binary variable that takes the value 0 in 2004 and 
2006, and the value 1 in 2007, 2011 and 2013. 
The treatment group is defined by a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
respondent receives any disability or caregiving subsidy, and zero otherwise. 
Nonetheless, we have discarded the small number of individuals who were receiving 
“public disability pension”, both in the pre and post reform period, because they 
correspond to the special case of non-contributory pension whose long-term care 
benefits show specific features (commented in section II). Therefore, individuals who at 
the time of the survey were not receiving any type of benefit compose the control group.  
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We are interested in the magnitude of the coefficient 𝛾1, which denotes the 
changes in the amount saved after the introduction of SAAD. The average treatment 
effect refers to the effect over and above the effect of time trends, region-specific effects 
and controlling for other characteristics such as regional GDP per capita in real terms 
and unemployment rate, individual income (in euros), marital status and need for doing 
daily living activities (Katz index). 
We specifically distinguish three types of samples, namely those who receive 
cash and in kind subsidies, individuals over and under 75 years of age, and childless 
individuals, given that whilst childless individuals might have to spend the subsidy, 
those with children might not end up spending the entire subsidy.  We observed a period 
before the reform in 2004 and took advantage of the fact that some interviews in the 
2006 wave were carried out in 2007, which allows us to identify further the initial 
effects of exposure to the subsidy expansion. Further to that, waves 4 and 5 in 2011 and 
2013, respectively, correspond to the period after the intervention. The advantage of the 
2013 wave is that it allows us to identify the effect of the 2012 policy adjustment.  
In addition to the baseline model, we specifically examine the potentially heterogeneous 
effects between childless individuals and individuals with children. The reason for this 
is that some share of the population may have either a bequest motive for saving, which 
we hypothesise to be stronger for respondents who have children to bequest to. But the 
most important reason, has to do with the fact that savings are more likely to decline 
with childless individuals as they are less likely to rely on informal care. To test our 
hypothesis further, we consider alternative specifications for childless individuals.  
One final concern results is the possibility that those who did not benefit from SAAD 
could have also been affected by the reform if they thought that they needed to save less 
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after introduction of SAAD. However, we think this is unlikely for two reasons. First, 
individuals tend to underestimate or ignore the risk of becoming dependent (Brown and 
Finkelstein, 2009; Zhou-Richter et al., 2010). Second, as the reform was quite stringent 
in implementing needs tests it is unlikely that individuals can expect ex-ante to qualify, 
and consistently, as we show below, the saving rates of the control group did not 
significantly change after the reform.  
 
2. Data 
We use data from SHARE for Wave 1 (2004), Wave 2 (2006–7), Wave 4 (2011) and 
Wave 5 (2013).6 This survey is the European equivalent of the Health and Retirement 
Survey. SHARE is a panel dataset of interviewees born in 1960 or earlier and their 
partners covering several countries including Spain, and to date is the most 
comprehensive dataset available in Europe that permits examination of the effects of 
changes in public long-term care policies. The data contains information on a long list 
of controls, including parental characteristics, demographics (e.g. age, gender, marital 
status, number of children), controls for health and dependency (Katz index) and 
personal monthly income7. Our sample contains 11,500 observations of individuals 
aged 55 and older8.  
Table A1 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics of the covariates used in 
our (the Spanish) sample. Importantly, we find no significant differences between the 
                                                          
6 Unfortunately, Wave 3 could not be included, because it was not comparable with other waves as it 
mainly provided a retrospective analysis of respondent backward behavior.  
7 Income has been defined according the the variable “thinc” which is available for waves 1, 2, 4 and 5 of 
SHARE. (Share. Release Guide 5.0.0). 
8 We have excluded younger individuals because the number of long-term care beneficiaries was 
negligible.  
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treatment and control group in marital status, income and education. With respect to age 
and gender, some men are on average older in the treatment group than men in the 
control group. The distribution of the dependency need (approximated by the Katz’s 
index) does not change significantly between the pre and post reform periods for cash 
beneficiaries and no beneficiaries. However, for home care beneficiaries there has been 
an increase in the highest dependency level and a parallel decrease in the fraction of 
non-dependent individuals. When we distinguish by the type of benefit, namely cash or 
in kind, we find that individuals receiving in kind benefits are more likely to be women, 
and the same applied to non-beneficiaries. Those receiving cash benefits after the 
reform are younger, whereas those receiving in kind benefits before the reform were 
less literate. As expected, receptors of cash benefits before the reform were mainly in 
the first quintile of income. This evidence is important in interpreting the meaning of 
the coefficients after the introduction of care subsidisation, and specifically in 
interpreting the results as a quasi-experiment. 
The SHARE questionnaire records information for both caregiving benefits and 
the public provision of home care services for waves 1, 2 and 5. However, wave 4 only 
records caregiving benefits, and the provision of home care has been omitted from the 
questionnaire. Given the substitution between formal and informal care, it is important 
to include the full information for wave 4 by using a multiple imputation procedure to 
correct for missing data (Rubin, 2007). This technique allows to predict what the 
random missing values would have been using information from the whole data set 
(waves 1, 2, 4 and 5). This technique requires two assumptions: (i) the data must be 
missing at random, which is clearly fulfilled because observations for public home care 
are missing for all individuals in wave 4 and (ii) the reasons for the data being missed 
must be captured by other variables that do not have missing values. As the missing 
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variable has a binary nature, a logistic imputation method has been chosen, and the 
following explanatory variables have been introduced: age, gender, being married, 
having co-resident children, pathologies (stroke, mental illness, Parkinsonism, hip 
fracture) and left-wing regional government. To test the sensitivity of our results, we 
have selected five different randomly seed value and added five different imputations to 
our main data set. The results in these alternative cases were very similar to the original 
estimations. 
We have not included any specific variable related to copayment for two 
reasons. First, each region designed a different copayment system, and therefore, its 
effect is likely to be picked up by the set of regional fixed effects. Second, even when 
co-payments have been put in place, the entire co-payment structure was annulled by a 
National High Court Ruling (25th February 2011)9. 
Finally, given that the implementation was not harmonic across the territory we 
define the binary variable “slow region” that takes the value 1 when the ratio between 
the benefits and awardees was 50% below the average for Spain in 2007 or 12.5% 
below the average for Spain in 2011. We also define the binary variable “fast-tracking 
region” that takes the value 1 when the ratio between the benefits and awardees was 
25% above the average for Spain in 2007 or 12.5% above the average for Spain in 2011 
(description of slow and fast-tracking regions in footnotes of Table 3 and 4). 
3. Preliminary evidence 
Figure 2 shows the trends in savings and wealth for Spanish beneficiaries of the subsidy 
(Treatment) and non-beneficiaries (Control) without controlling for the relevant 
                                                          
9 CERMI (Spanish Committee of Disabled People) took legal action to Court claiming that the procedure 
by which the co-payment regulation was formally invalid as it did not have the legal status of ordinary 
law. 
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individual characteristics. Recall that the reception of subsidised care is purely based on 
needs, and before the introduction of SAAD, care was means tested. Interestingly, the 
trends in savings indicate that, although there was little difference between savings of 
the treated and control groups before the onset of the SAAD, after its implementation 
these trends shifted so that those who received the subsidy during SAAD exhibited 
lower savings than the control group, which did not receive the subsidy. Figure 2 
reveals savings trajectories of individuals over 55 years of age (in thousand €). 
Importantly, it distinguishes beneficiaries in a dotted line from non- beneficiaries, and 
breaks downs the latter in those who receive economic or cash and in–kind benefits. 
The picture emerging from these results suggests evidence of a trend of savings 
reduction that is bucked in the period 2006-7 for those who do not benefit from SAAD. 
The gap between beneficiaries and non–beneficiaries is especially large in the period 
2011-13 and it amounts almost to 4,000 €. Importantly, among those who benefit from 
SAAD we find an overall small decline in total savings, and that corrects itself after 
2012 when subsidies were made less generous.  
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the percentage of individuals with positive 
savings. We appreciate similar trends for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries between 
2004 and 2007. Nevertheless, between 2007 and 2011, the percentage with positive 
savings increases for non-beneficiaries, but decreases for beneficiaries. In the last 
interval (2011-2013), the percentage with positive savings shows increasing trends for 
both groups. 
The consistent estimate of coefficient 𝛾1 requires the fulfilment of the “parallel 
trend” assumption, that is, the same average change in the outcome variable for the 
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control and treatment group in the absence of the reform. As the counterfactual is not 
observable, it is difficult to test this assumption. However, the vertical line in Figures 2 
and 3 allow a visual comparison of the pre-reform and post-reform years. As appears 
from figures, average savings and percentage of individuals with positive savings of 
beneficiaries (treatment) and non-beneficiaries (control) have followed a similar trend 
until 2007. 
An alternative way of discerning the effect of the SAAD reform on savings is 
displayed in Table 1. Indeed, we distinguish the savings of beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries before and after the reform. In addition, we examine the effect 
distinguishing two age groups that is, those over and under 75 years of age given that 
the Spanish tax system organization gives rise to a spike in income after that age10. As 
expected, we find that hose under 75 exhibit higher savings (in light of a single live 
cycle model). However, those under 75 unaffected by the reform exhibit an average 
increase in savings of 4,832€ whilst those affected exhibit an average savings reduction 
of 1,113€. In contrast, we find a reduction in savings among those over 75 year of age 
for both SAAD beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. However, the large standard 
deviation suggests a limited prevision of such changes and call for further analysis. 
Similarly, when we distinguish between cash and in-kind benefits, we find that the 
savings reductions are primarily driven by a reduction in savings among those who 
receive cash benefits for both over and under 75 years of age. In contrast they don´t 
suggest a statistical significant change among those receiving in-kind benefits.  
                                                          
10 The threshold of 75 years has been chosen because individuals older than 75 years benefit from higher 
reduction in the tax base. These reductions have remained throughout the whole period 2004-2013. The 
amount of income not subject to the income tax is around 1,100€ higher for people aged 75 and older. 
(Royal Legislative Decree 3/2004 of 5 March 2005 which approved the revised text of the Personal 
Income Tax Law and Act 35/2006 on 28 November 2006 of Personal Income Tax). 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
IV. Results 
1. Baseline results 
Table 2 shows results of the DID estimates of the effect of the SAAD reform on savings 
for the total sample and the childless sample. We report the estimates on the amount of 
monthly savings (external margin) and the probability of saving (internal margin), and 
in addition, distinguish individuals depending on whether they are above or below the 
age of 75, and whether they have children or not. The reason to distinguish those that 
have children lies in that bequests are a powerful savings motivation. We control for 
covariates including need (Katz index), marital status, socio-demographics, income, 
education, regional unemployment and regional GDP per capita in real terms, given 
than part of the period examined was subject to an economic recession. We also include 
regional fixed effects to pick up some specific unobservable effects correlated with a 
specific region.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
We find that compared to non-beneficiaries, individuals under 75 years of age who 
benefited from SAAD reduced their monthly savings by an average of 70€ (equivalent 
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to 11% of minimum wage for 2011)11, and it was not statically different among the 
childless sample. However, no significant effect overall is found for individuals over 75 
years of age. These results are consistent with our earlier hypothesis that (precautionary) 
savings decline after an individual qualifies for a LTC  subsidy. However, as expected, 
the effects were heterogeneous by age cut-off point. Individuals over 75 years of age 
would have already made their financial arrangements, and hence, did not always 
exhibit a reduction in savings after the introduction of SAAD.  
 
The second panel of Table 2 shows the results of the analysis distinguishing 
between beneficiaries of cash and in-kind benefits. When we distinguish those who 
receive in-kind or cash benefits, we find that the previous results were only driven by 
individuals receiving cash benefits who reduce their monthly savings by 84.6€ (13% of 
minimum wage for 2011). The latter effect is lower among childless people. Finally, we 
find a reduction in savings of about 56€ (8.7% of minimum wage for 2011) among over 
75-year-old individuals who receive in-kind care. Nevertheless, such reduction did not 
show up among the childless sample, and is consistent with previous evidence revealing 
that savings of childless individuals are less reactive to the introduction of a subsidy, 
perhaps due to their reduced availability of informal care12. When we examine the effect 
of the SAAD reform on the probability of saving, the picture is not very different. We 
find no effect overall, and a reduction for childless individuals less than 75 year of age. 
However, when the distinguish by type of benefits, we find as before that the effect is 
                                                          
11 In percentage of caregiver allowances received in 2011 (see Figure 1), savings reduction represented 
13.2% of caregiver allowance for major dependent level 2, 16.8% for major dependent level 1; 20.8% for 
severe dependent level 2; 23.3% for severe dependent level 1; 38.9% for moderate dependent level 2. 
12 Caregiving allowances may serve other purposes in addition to relieving some financial burden of care 
to existing caregivers (replacing paid for unpaid care), but primarily they could attract potential caregivers 
into providing care, if allowances modify pre-existing intergenerational arrangements (Costa-Font et al, 
2016).  
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mainly driven by no change among those who receive in-kind care, and a reduction 
between 15-17% in the probability of saving among those who receive cash benefits. 
Importantly, the comparison of the upper and lower part of Table 2 indicates that the 
results appear to be robust to the inclusion of a long list of covariates. 
2. Regional implementation effects 
One of the important features of the SAAD reform in Spain is that its 
implementation was not homogenous across regions (Costa-Font, 2010). Indeed, some 
regions, arguably for political reasons took longer to implement the reform. Hence, a 
separate analysis by type of region can provide different estimates. Table 3 provides a 
similar empirical strategy as in the first columns of Table 2 focusing on the internal 
margin (amount saved), but distinguishing by type of region. As expected, the savings 
reduction was significantly higher than average for regions that did not delay the 
implementation of SAAD (fast-tracking regions). For the under 75 year of age sample, 
we find a savings reduction of 110€, and 82€ form the sample of individuals over 75 
(17% and 12.7% of minimum wage for 2011, respectively).  In contrast, when we 
examine the effect among the slow implementer regions, the effect was only significant 
among the sample of individuals under 75, but the monthly savings reduction was about 
one fourth of the magnitude compared to the other regions (20€).  
Consistently, the reduction in savings was found lower among childless individuals 
and was primarily driven by cash benefit reception. In contrast, in fast-tracking regions, 
the effect of in-kind benefits was significant, but of a smaller magnitude than savings 
reduction of cash benefits, both among under 75 (127€) and over 75 years of age 
(106€). These conclusions remain when we examine the effect among the childless 
sample. 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 reports the DID effect of SAAD reform on the probability of saving 
(external margin) employing the same list of controls as before. In all estimates we find 
an overall reduction in the probability of saving. However, for slow regions the 
probability of reduction is small (2-3%) whilst for the fast-tracking regions the 
reduction is five times larger (10-17%). Again, as before the effect is mainly driven by a 
reduction in the probability of saving among those who receive cash benefits. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
3. Heterogeneous impact of the reform and robustness checks 
Table 5 shows the effect over time and across income groups. Indeed, we hypothesise 
that before SAAD, mainly lower-income groups would be affected, but after the 
introduction of SAAD the effect would be more scattered. Consistently, we find that the 
savings reductions were in top and middle-income groups, particularly in 2007 and 
2011. This is important because, previously to the implementation of the reform, low 
income individuals would qualify for a caregiving allowance. Hence, the effect of 
SAAD is likely to have had a more than proportional effect on individuals that would 
not have qualify for support beforehand.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The first panel of Table 5 reports the interaction between income quintiles and the 
treatment by age group (above or below 75) and the total and childless sample. Results 
indicate that relative to the lower income quintile, those at the second quintile exhibit a 
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larger reduction of savings after SAAD. As expected, the effect is larger among 
individuals under 75 years of age (83€), and the reduction is larger among the childless 
sample (121€) as they are less likely to rely on informal care. We observe a significant 
savings reduction among those at the third quintile of income (a magnitude of 63€ for 
those under 75 years of age and 58€ for those older than 75). The third and firth panel of 
Table 5 distinguish the income quintile effects for beneficiaries of cash and in-kind 
benefits. Importantly, and consistently with expectations, we find that the effect is 
primarily driven by those individuals under 75 who receive cash benefits in the second 
(271€) and third quintile (138€). Similarly, the same effect among those over 75 is 
consistently large in the second (167€) and third quintile (130€), too. In contrast, the 
effect of in-kind benefits is very modest compared to cash benefits and it concentrates in 
the second and third quintile of income. 
 
The second panel of Table 5 shows the specific effects of the interaction of the 
treatment on the 2013 wave. Importantly, the results suggest as expected an upward 
correction of savings that ranges between 185€ for individuals under 75€ to 50€ for 
those over 75 who are childless. No effects are found among those over 75, and among 
the childless, an income rise is only found for individuals in the second quintile of 
income. Consistently, the fourth and sixth panel in Table 5 distinguish the income 
quintile effects for beneficiaries of cash and in-kind benefits. Our findings consistently 
suggest an effect, which is primarily driven by those individuals under 75 who receive 
cash benefits in the second (204€) and third quintile (110€). No effect is found among 
those individuals over 75 years of age. We only identify a small monthly savings 
reduction ranging between 20€ to 30€ among those at the second quintile of income that 
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received in-kind benefits. Finally, as a simple robustness check we have tried has been 
to exclude wave 4 in from the analysis, and we consistently find comparable effects.  
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we set out to test whether the universalisation of a public subsidy for LTC 
has an effect on individuals’ precautionary savings. Previous research has mainly relied 
on the effect of health and unemployment insurance, which would be expected to 
influence short-term savings, while long-term care insurance would influence longer-
term savings motivations, including both precautionary and bequest motivations. We 
took advantage of the reform introduced in Spain in 2007, which we refer under the 
acronym SAAD, which progressively universalised a subsidy for LTC and which was 
unanticipated and orthogonal to savings. This care reform replaced the previous means-
tested care with a tax-funded universal subsidy, the magnitude of which was slashed in 
2012. To distinguish between bequest and precautionary motivations, we also examined 
the effect among childless individuals. 
 We find evidence of a robust reduction in savings which ammounts between 13-
38% of the average individual subsidy. However, the effect is driven by a savings 
reduction amongst individuals receiving cash benefits (caregiving allowance) rather 
than those that benefit from in-kind services (home care). We find a smaller, but 
significant, reduction in savings among the childless sample consistent with the 
expectation that individuals that can potentially rely on informal care are more likely to 
save part of the subsidy. Consistently with the potential for crowding out, we find that  
spending cuts reducing the subsidy in 2012 incressed savings back up. As expected, the 
effect concentrates in the second and third income quintile, given that the SAAD reform 
was universal in scope and before the reform lower income individuals already had 
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access to some means tested support. Furthermore, we find that the effects  was 
primarily driven by individuals under the age of 75. It is important to note that the 
magnitude of savings reduction is larger among those under 75, given the existence of 
as income tax notch around the  age of 75. 
These results indicate that individuals’ savings indeed are sensitive to changes in 
public subsidies consistently with previous research on other forms of social protection 
schemes (Attanasio and Brugiavini, 2003; Di Dardi et al, 2010). However, what is 
unique form LTC subsidies is that the reduction in savings (and change in savings 
behavior) was mainly the result of a displacement effect of cash subsidies as opposed to 
home help support. Hence, the evidence from Spain does not support a generalised 
saving crowding out explanantion. Instead, they are suggestive that the effect 
concentrates on the unconditional nature of cash subsidies. There are other explanations 
at play, including the fact that in-kind services might still require some additional 
complementary informal care, and more importantly, unlike cash benefits they are 
generally not perceived as an extra household income topping up existing pension or 
household income. Hence, in kind services appear to be more efficient that cash 
subsidies if public long term care programs attempt to be as neutral as possible with 
household decision making.  
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Figure 1. Disability and caregiver allowance entitlements in Spain by SHARE 
wave  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For a better understanding of the amount of caregiver allowance and disability allowance, they can be compared with 
minimum wage: 460.50 €/month (2004), 540.90 €/month (2006), 570.60 €/month (2007), 641.40 €/month (2011), 
645.30 €/month (2013). 
 
 
 
  
Disability Allowance (degree of 
disability higher than 65%) 
• Before 1990: 286€ (including 
caregiver and transport 
allowance).  
• Means-tested (very strict 
income threshold) 
• After 1990: 322  € 
Age: 18-65 years  
Additional 161€  for caregiver 
allowance in case of high 
disability 
 
2004 & 2006 
Wave 1 &2 
Caregiver allowance  
(art. 18 SAAD Act).: 
• Major dependency. Level 2: 487 € 
• Major dependency. Level 1: 390 € 
• No means-tested, but with 
copayments (computed according 
to awardee’s income and assets) 
 
ACT 39/2006, of 14th December, on the 
Promotion of Personal Autonomy and 
Care for Dependent Persons (SAAD) 
Coverage expansion to severe 
dependent and moderate 
dependent  
(level 2) 
 Major Dep. Level 2: 530 € 
 Major Dep. Level 1: 417 € 
 Severe Dep. Level 2: 337 € 
 Severe Dep. Level 1: 300 € 
 Moderate Dep. Level 2: 180 € 
 Co-payment was suspended 
during 2011 by High-Court 
Ruling 
 
2011 
Wave 4  
2007 
Wave 2 
2013 
Wave  5 
Budgetary cuts introduced by 
Royal Decree 20/2012, July 13th  
 Previous beneficiaries: 
 Major Dep. Level 2: 442 € 
 Major Dep. Level 1: 354 € 
 Severe Dep. Level 2: 236 € 
 Severe Dep. Level 1: 255 € 
 Mod. Dep. Level 2: 153 € 
 New beneficiaries: 
(disappearance of distinction 
between levels) 
 Major Dep.: 387 € 
 Severe Dep: 268 € 
 Mod. Dep.: 153 € 
 
 
 29 
Figure 2. Savings among Spanish individuals (thousand € 2011 real terms)  
 
 
 
Note: This figure reports the pattern corresponding to average cumulative monthly (self-reported) savings 
maintained (in thousand €) of those benefiting and not benefiting from the LTC subsidy. Source: Own 
work using SHARE data. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of individuals with positive savings  
 
  
Note: This figure reports the average percentage of individuals who report to have positive savings 
benefiting and not benefiting from the LTC subsidy. Source: Own work using SHARE data. 
 
 
Table 1.  Savings before and after the Spanish Reform. Real savings (€ 2011) 
 
 Non beneficiaries Beneficiaries 
Age  Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform 
<75 years 13,062 17,895 11,286 10,399 
 (18,027) (25,936) (21,363) (22,119) 
75 years 5,475 3,678 5,771 5,239 
 (17,709) (29,613) (23,055) (22,223) 
N 2,479 7,838 177 1,010 
 Economic (Cash) benefits In-kind benefits 
 Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform 
<75 years 14,171 10,925 9,982 9,661 
 (15,867) (12,737) (18,895) (22,575) 
75 years 5,475 4,855 5,898 5,796 
 (12,369) (8,206) (13,210) (14,419) 
N 12 343 165 667 
Note: This table reports average cumulative monthly savings maintained  before and after the reform. Standard deviation between 
parenthesis. . Source: Own work using SHARE data. 
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Table 2. Monthly Savings and Long Term Care Reform in Spain (Internal and 
External margin) 
 Monthly Savings (€ 2011) Probabiltity [Savings >0] 
 Total sample Childless subsample Total sample Childless subsample 
 <75 75 <75 75 <75 75 <75 75 
Without sociodemographic explanatory variables 
Beneficiaries*POST -71.3** -32.7 -72.4*** 19.7 -0.093 -0.057 -0.140*** -0.031 
 (29.87) (23.15) (24.46) (35.77) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
N 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 
R2 0.289 0.277 0.291 0.296 0.211 0.187 0.205 0.218 
Cash benefit*POST -85.7** -81.6 -76.8*** 33.9 -0.151*** -0.174*** -0.175*** -0.189** 
 (33.25) (47.16) (26.31) (62.89) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) 
N 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 
R2 0.271 0.268 0.244 0.252 0.156 0.164 0.210 0.2224 
In-kind benefit*POST -32.8 -58.6*** -45.0 -52.9 -0.016 -0.023 -0.009 -0.011 
 (25.32) (17.12) (43.12) (27.85) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) 
N 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 
R2 0.214 0.270 0.220 0.259 0.150 0.152 0.154 0.163 
Marital status No No No No No No No No 
Katz Index No No No No No No No No 
Income No No No No No No No No 
Education No No No No No No No No 
GDPpc  Unemp No No No No No No No No 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
With sociodemographic explanatory variables 
Beneficiaries*POST -70.7** -31.0 -71.6*** 18.5 -0.091 -0.055 -0.138** -0.030 
 (27.17) (21.08) (23.24) (34.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
N 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 
R2 0.342 0.318 0.338 0.336 0.275 0.247 0.260 0.278 
Cash benefit*POST -84.6** -83.8 -77.4*** 32.0 -0.149*** -0.175*** -0.176*** -0.188** 
 (31.18) (45.10) (25.20) (61.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) 
N 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 
R2 0.342 0.316 0.338 0.331 0.212 0.227 0.273 0.269 
In-kind benefit*POST -30.4 -56.1*** -45.0 -54.9 -0.014 -0.021 -0.010 -0.012 
 (27.60) (16.06) (44.26) (26.85) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) 
N 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 
R2 0.345 0.318 0.318 0.339 0.212 0.203 0.201 0.211 
Marital status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Katz Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GDPpc  Unemp Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Each cell reports the result of a different regression. Due to space constraints, we only show the coefficient and standard error 
corresponding to the interaction term, the sample size and the R-squared. We control for a number of covariates including need 
(Katz index), marital status, socio-demographics, real income, education, regional unemployment and regional GDP per capita in 
real terms given than some of the period examined was subject to an economic recession. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant 
at 1% level.  
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Table 3. Slow implementer and other regions. Monthly Savings (€ 2011). Internal 
margin 
 Slow implementer regions Fast-tracking regions 
 Total sample Childless subsample Total sample Childless subsample 
 <75 75 <75 75 <75 75 <75 75 
Beneficiaries*POST -20.17** --36.75 -11.2*** 11.7 -110.4** -81.7** -80.5*** -21.58 
 (8.16) (19.78) (5.23) (23.17) (23.47) (30.12) (20.15) (34.06) 
N 1,733 554 636 144 1,522 501 757 122 
R2 0.386 0.356 0.356 0.380 0.237 0.227 0.225 0.236 
Cash benefit*POST -37.8*** -25.12 -17.2*** 23.2 -127.45** -105.62** -90.27*** -47.5*** 
 (8.69) (7.04) (4.43) (31.51) (20.27) (41.12) (31.32) (12.14) 
N 1,733 554 636 144 1,522 501 757 122 
R2 0.397 0.366 0.366 0.390 0.244 0.233 0.231 0.243 
In-kind benefit*POST -12.4 -17.4 -37.87 -27.58 -21.87** -75.23*** -12.87** -87.47** 
 (15.84) (17.12) (24.10) (38.89) (8.61) (23.12) (5.52) (21.36) 
N 1,733 554 636 144 1,522 501 757 122 
R2 0.369 0.340 0.340 0.363 0.227 0.217 0.215 0.226 
Marital status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Katz Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GDPpc  Unemp Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Each cell reports the result of a different regression. Due to space constraints, we only show the coefficient and standard error 
corresponding to the interaction term, the sample size and the R-squared. We control for a number of covariates including need 
(Katz index), marital status, socio-demographics, real income education, regional unemployment and regional GDP per capita in 
real terms given than some of the period examined was subject to an economic recession. We define the binary variable “slow 
region” that takes the value 1 when the ratio between the beneficiaries receiving long-term care benefits and total number of 
awardees (including those who have been recognized as dependent, but are waiting for long-term care benefit) was 50% below the 
average for Spain in 2007 or 12.5% below the average for Spain in 2011. Slow regions 2007: Asturias (22.04%), Baleares (7.09%), 
Canarias (30.15%), Galicia (31.47%), average for Spain (64.35%). Slow regions 2011: Canarias (61.28%), Baleares (42.09%), C. 
Valenciana (57,85%), Galicia (54.63%), average for Spain (70.37%)  We define the binary variable “fast-tracking region” that takes 
the value 1 when the ratio between the beneficiaries receiving long-term care benefits and total number of awardees (including those 
who have been recognized as dependent, but are waiting for long-term care benefit). was 25% above the average for Spain in 2007 
or 12.5% above the average for Spain in 2011. Fast-tracking regions in 2007 are: Navarra (87.875), País Vasco (99.44%), Ceuta 
(79.39%). Fast-tracking regions in 2011 are Rioja (88.11%), Madrid (84.74%), Cantabria (83.82%), Castilla León (84.75%), Ceuta 
(87.98%) and País Vasco (77.53%). ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.  
Table 4. Slow and front-running regions. Monthly Savings. External margin  
 Slow regions Fast-tracking regions 
 Total sample Childless subsample Total sample Childless subsample 
 <75 75 <75 75 <75 75 <75 75 
Beneficiaries*POST -0.011* -0.007 -0.035** -0.027 -0.145** -0.098*** -0.178** -0.162** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
N 1,733 554 636 144 1,522 501 757 122 
R2 0.374 0.344 0.344 0.367 0.225 0.215 0.213 0.224 
Cash benefit*POST 
-
0.025*** -0.036** -0.028** -0.034* -0.236*** -0.289*** -0.285*** -0.301*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) 
N 1,733 554 636 144 1,522 501 757 122 
R2 0.384 0.353 0.353 0.377 0.231 0.221 0.219 0.230 
In-kind benefit*POST -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.078*** -0.033 -0.101*** -0.025 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
N 1,733 554 636 144 1,522 501 757 122 
R2 0.357 0.328 0.328 0.351 0.215 0.205 0.203 0.214 
Marital status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Katz Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GDPpc  Unemp Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Same footnote that Table 3 
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Table 5. Income Interactions and the 2012 Reform 
(1st quintile: highest income: 5th quintile: lowest income) 
 Monthly Savings (€ 2011) 
 Total sample Childless subsample 
 <75 75 <75 75 
Beneficiaries     
Treatment -37.14** -35.17*** -25.48** -27.88** 
 (15.36) (10.69) (10.00) (13.84) 
Treatment*POST*(2007-2011)     
Real income: 2nd quintile -83.00*** -44.22*** -121.51*** -21.37*** 
 (26.72) (19.88) (41.80) (3.04) 
Real income: 3nd quintile -63.16*** -57.86*** -86.09** -69.97 
 (26.54) (21.06) (41.26) (43.16) 
Real income: 4nd quintile -21.99*** -36.10 -67.84** -55.15 
 (6.87) (29.75) (21.11) (40.40) 
Real income: 5nd quintile -27.50*** -41.38 -19.71** -82.13 
 (6.32) (30.04) (8.86) (51.98) 
Treatment* 2013     
Real income: 2nd quintile 185.35*** 31.12 92.16** 50.85*** 
 (26.53) (23.50) (43.04) (5.27) 
Real income: 3nd quintile 91.60*** 33.32 59.83** 17.80 
 (26.49) (24.30) (20.79) (20.59) 
Real income: 4nd quintile 46.04*** 41.97 30.89 17.63 
 (6.97) (32.55) (43.22) (47.23) 
Real income: 5nd quintile 25.60*** 67.52 38.25 26.43 
 (6.21) (42.37) (26.56) (57.20) 
N 8,713 2,787 3,198 725 
R2 0.364 0.335 0.335 0.358 
Cash benefit     
Treatment -85.13*** -79.23*** -77.41*** -70.81*** 
 (22.48) (20.80) (29.35) (23.70) 
Treatment*POST*(2007-2011)     
Real income: 2nd quintile -270.81*** -166.80*** -103.81* -46.54*** 
 (29.38) (23.23) (27.69) (13.40) 
Real income: 3nd quintile -137.92*** -129.95*** -86.39* -16.29** 
 (27.50) (21.83) (27.11) (36.23) 
Real income: 4nd quintile -72.78*** -43.13*** -48.54** -1.93 
 (27.58) (29.03) (20.87) (32.16) 
Real income: 5nd quintile -31.71*** 13.99 10.42 -9.09 
 (9.40) (22.00) (9.75) (34.16) 
Treatment* 2013     
Real income: 2nd quintile 203.66*** -14.96 88.91*** 67.87** 
 (20.19) (8.57) (34.63) (26.93) 
Real income: 3nd quintile 110.10*** 4.35 77.79*** 11.86 
 (27.37) (3.75) (25.65) (20.07) 
Real income: 4nd quintile 74.94*** 37.95 51.37** 27.72 
 (27.99) (35.77) (19.40) (23.47) 
Real income: 5nd quintile 24.70** -14.74 43.86 7.19 
 (35.81) (14.24) (50.40) (7.29) 
N 8,713 725 3,198 2,787 
R2 0.351 0.344 0.322 0.322 
In-kind benefit     
Treatment -40.32*** -38.20*** -59.29** -41.35** 
 (5.30) (13.77) (18.19) (20.60) 
Treatment*POST*(2007-2011)     
Real income: 2nd quintile -54.32*** -44.06*** -19.53** -28.28** 
 (4.11) (13.82) (8.56) (10.02) 
Real income: 3nd quintile -24.95** -36.49*** -6.35 -28.24 
 (10.19) (7.14) (8.83) (9.13) 
Real income: 4nd quintile -13.89 -11.27 -5.51 -22.61 
 (7.80) (9.50) (9.46) (5.25) 
Real income: 5nd quintile -28.51 -15.67 -20.14 -21.56 
 (13.57) (9.16) (12.27) (10.30) 
Treatment* 2013     
Real income: 2nd quintile 30.22** 28.45*** 19.94** 20.05** 
 (12.97) (9.76) (7.21) (1.46) 
Real income: 3nd quintile 6.53 14.51 12.12 42.37 
 (17.20) (12.28) (16.88) (40.17) 
Real income: 4nd quintile 16.13 29.14 28.97 32.19 
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 (18.61) (15.24) (17.19) (13.15) 
Real income: 5nd quintile 25.05 70.42 42.20 76.53 
 (42.75) (31.26) (40.95) (41.77) 
N 725 2,787 3,198 8,713 
R2 0.417 0.390 0.390 0.424 
Note: Each cell reports the results for a single regression. Due to space constraints we only report the coefficients and standard 
errors for the treatment variable, its interaction with income quintile and year(2007-2011), and its interaction with income quintile 
and year(2013). controls include age, gender, marital status, level of education, dependency need approximated by Katx’s index, 
regional fixed effects, time trends, income quintile, interaction terms: (beneficiaries or ltc_benefit or home_care)*YEAR(2007-
2011), (beneficiaries or ltc_benefit or home_care)*YEAR(2013), income quintile*YEAR(2007-2011), income 
quintile*YEAR(2013), income quintile*(beneficiaries or ltc_benefit or home_care). 
   
   
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics  
 
 Cash benefits In-kind benefits No beneficiaries 
 Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform 
Male 49.36 50.45 27.04 35.81 42.45 45.10 
Age 73.09 63.97 75.49 77.96 65.89 68.45 
 (11.34) (10.56) (11.17) (10.45) (10.37) (11.16) 
Dependency need       
Katz0 53.21 53.04 52.83 43.62 87.67 87.22 
Katz1 27.42 28.37 22.64 23.24 8.77 7.12 
Katz2 8.35 8.42 11.95 12.07 2.12 2.69 
Katz3 11.02 10.17 12.58 21.07 1.44 2.97 
Marital status       
Married 73.38 75.75 52.20 62.91 74.41 78.48 
Separated/divorced 5.33 4.45 2.52 1.78 3.36 2.68 
Single 3.34 4.69 5.03 4.35 7.09 4.96 
Widow 10.34 13.01 39.62 30.37 14.98 13.34 
Missing marital status 7.61 2.10 0.63 0.30 0.16 0.26 
Level of education       
No elementary 41.10 42.12 28.93 43.62 17.94 25.82 
Elementary education 40.54 36.67 57.23 42.14 59.67 52.74 
Elementary education 15.35 18.44 4.40 3.66 7.01 7.61 
College education 3.01 2.77 2.52 1.29 6.73 5.75 
Real income       
1st quintile 48.24 46.13 1.89 20.97 2.76 23.14 
2nd quintile 16.24 14.83 18.24 30.66 12.37 20.66 
3rd quintile 9.42 10.69 18.24 24.43 14.94 20.54 
4th quintile 7.77 10.12 23.90 15.13 22.83 19.85 
5th quintile 18.32 18.23 37.74 8.80 47.10 15.79 
Savings (€2011) 10,894 6,770 8,001 7,407 9,864 11,534 
 (13,458) (10,211) (16,117) (17,420) (17,981) (27,622) 
Number of Observations 12 343 165 667                      2,479 7,834 
Katz’s index is not directly provided by SHARE, but has been obtained using information of disabilities for doing 
daily living activities following Katz (1983). Katz’s index measures disability status using a scale from 0 
(independent) to 6 (totally dependent). We have defined the following variables: Katz0 corresponds to level 0 of 
Katz’s index, Katz1 corresponds to level 1 and 2 of Katz’s Index, Katz2 corresponds to level 3 and 4 and Katz3 
corresponds to levels 5 and 6. 
Katz index cannot be assimilated to the dependency need of the SAAD. The dependency need of the SAAD is 
obtained with a specific Ranking Scale, which evaluates 57 daily living activities, the degree of difficulty and level of 
supervision and obtains a score ranging from 0 to 100. The corresponding need of dependency is: no dependent (less 
than 25 points), moderate dependent level 1 (25-39 points), moderate dependent level 2 (40-49 points), severe 
dependent level 1 (50-64 points), severe dependent level 2 (65-74 points), major dependent level 1 (75-89 points), 
major dependent level 2 (90-100 points). (Royal Decree 504/2007, 20th April). 
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Table A2. Relationship between LTC-benefit, GDP per capita and minimum wage 
 
 Ratio between LTC-benefit and GDPpc (%) Ratio between LTC-benefit 
and minimum wage (%) Poorest region Richest region Average 
2007 36.29 19.31 24.46 85.35 
2008 37.26 19.66 25.06 84.49 
2009 39.28 21.01 26.77 83.19 
2010 39.37 20.76 26.92 82.22 
2011 39.92 20.50 26.52 81.18 
2012 35.10 17.67 23.09 69.00 
2013 35.35 17.73 23.59 68.59 
Source: Own work using data from National Institute of Statistics and Official State Bulletin. 
 
 
